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"WHAT'S SO MAGIC[AL] ABOUT BLACK WOMEN?"t
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AT THE
INTERSECTION OF RACE AND GENDER
Jean (-Montoya*
INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the evolving constitutional restraints on the
exercise of peremptory challenges in jury selection.' Approximately ten
years ago, in the landmark case of Batson v. Kentucky,2 the United
States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids
prosecutors to exercise race-based peremptory challenges, at least when
the excluded jurors and the defendant share the same race.3 Over the
next ten years, the Court extended Batson's reach.
The first of several extensions occurred five years after Batson in
Powers v. Ohio.4 In that case, the Court clarified that a prosecutor's
race-based peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause
even when the defendant and the excluded jurors do not share the same
race. 5 The same year, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,6 the Court
held that race-based peremptory challenges by private civil litigants also
violate the Equal Protection Clause.7 The following year, in Georgia v.
t See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. J.D., U.C.L.A. School of
Law, 1985; A.B., Princeton University, 1982. I am grateful to Deborah Kane,
Tiffany Kemp, and Christopher Hoffman for their able research assistance. I am
also grateful to my colleagues, Roy Brooks, Mary Jo Wiggins, and Fred Zacharias,
who commented on an earlier draft of the Article. The Article was delivered as a
work-in-progress at the October, 1995 Hispanic National Bar Association Conven-
tion in Puerto Rico and at the February, 1996 Forging Forward: Women of Color
and the Law Conference at Harvard Law School.
1. A peremptory challenge allows a litigant to exclude an otherwise qualified jury
panelist from the jury during jury selection. For a more detailed explanation of
what the peremptory challenge is and how it works, see infia notes 14-24 and
accompanying text.
2. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
4. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
5. Powers, 499 U.S. at 402.
6. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
7. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 616.
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McCollum,' the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause precludes
even criminal defendants from exercising race-based peremptory chal-
lenges.9 Most recently, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,' 0 the Court
held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids gender-based peremptory
challenges.
11
Appellate litigation regarding Batson's scope is likely to continue.
We can anticipate, for instance, that the Court will eventually consider
whether religion-based peremptory challenges offend the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 2 Another area ripe for the Court's consideration is the
8. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
9. MeCollum, 505 U.S. at 59.
10. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
11. J.E.B., 114 S. Cr. at 1421. For an interesting critique of J.E.B., see Roberta K.
Flowers, Does It Cost Too Much? A "Difference" Look at J.E.B. v. Alabama, 64
FoaRHnM L. REv. 491 (1995) (arguing thatJ.E.B should be read narrowly, as it
failed to recognize how the differences between men and women impact the deliber-
ation process).
12. Legal commentators have conduded that Batson applies to and forbids religion-
based peremptory challenges. See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimina-
tion in jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway? 92 CoLum. L. Rnv. 725, 764-66
(1992); Angela J. Mason, Note, Discrimination Based on Religious Affiliation: Another
Nail in the Peremptory Challenge's Coffin? 29 GA. L. REv. 493, 524-25, 536-37
(1995). But see J. Suzanne Bell Chambers, Note, Applying the Break: Religion and
the Peremptory Challenge, 70 IND. L.J. 569, 570, 593-601, 601-12 (1995) (distin-
guishing religion from race and gender and citing practical concerns).
In contrast, state courts generally have concluded that religion-based peremptory
challenges do not violate Batson. State v. Davis, No. C7-92-1037, 1993 WL 593, at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 1993), aff'd, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), and cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994); State v. Lundgren, Nos. 90-L-15-140, 91-L-036,
1993 WL 346444, at *39 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1993), ajffd, 653 N.E.2d 304
(Ohio 1995), and cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1276 (1996); Casarez v. State, No. 1114-
93, 1995 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 132, at *14 (Dec. 13, 1995) (reasoning that "it is
permissible to discriminate against prospective jurors on account of their beliefs"
and that "discrimination on the basis of religion is discrimination on the basis of
belief'). However, some state courts have observed that their state constitutions
forbid religion-based peremptory challenges. E.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748,
761-62 (Cal. 1978); Stare v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849 (Haw. 1990); Common-
wealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 515 & n.29, 516 n.33 (Mass. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); People v. Kagan, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987, 990 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1979).
J.E.B. restricts the Batson rule of nondiscrimination in jury selection to classifi-
cations subject to strict and heightened scrutiny. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429 (noting
that parties may use their peremptory challenges to exclude any group normally
subject to "rational basis" review). In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), the
Court, applying the First Amendment, subjected religion-based discrimination to
strict scrutiny. Larson, 456 U.S. at 244-46. It arguably follows that religion-based
peremptory challenges offend Batson. Mason, supra, at 522. Indeed, Justice Scalia
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exercise of peremptories that can be conceptualized as challenges based
on the intersection of race and gender-challenges based on
intersectionality. Such challenges purposely exclude jurors of a particular
race and a particular gender, for example, African American women or
Latino men.
This Article explores Batson's future, and in particular, the exten-
sion of Batson to claims of intersectional discrimination in jury selec-
tion. Part I examines the peremptory challenge as modified by Batson
and its progeny. The discussion confronts the assertions of Batson critics
and relies in part on original empirical work, a survey of trial lawyers
regarding their impressions of the pre- and post-Batson peremptory
challenge and Batson's burden on the courts. The results of the survey
indicate that the peremptory challenge retains its vitality despite the
evolving constitutional restraints on its exercise. The results of the
survey also indicate that Batson procedures are not consuming an exces-
sive amount of court time. With this backdrop set,'" Part II explores
the appropriateness of extending Batson to intersectional discrimination
in jury selection and the likely impact of that extension on the peremp-
tory challenge and the courts. The Article concludes that as a doctrinal
and normative matter Batson should be extended, and as a practical
matter can be extended, to intersectional discrimination in jury selec-
tion without dire consequences for the peremptory challenge or the
courts.
I. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: PRE- AND POST-BATsON
Peremptory challenges give a litigant the opportunity to shape the
jury that will decide the litigant's case at trial. Procedures vary from
has assumed that J.E.B. effectively extended Batson to religion-based peremptory
challenges. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994), however, the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case raising religion-based peremptory chal-
lenges. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2120. In that case, the petitioner, an African American,
argued that the prosecutor's race-neutral reason for striking a black juror-that the
juror was a Jehovah's Wimess-violated the Equal Protection Clause. Davis, 114
S. Ct. at 2120. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the denial
of certiorari. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2120.
13. A substantially similar discussion sets the backdrop for another of the author's
artides about jury selection: Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory
Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the "Blind" Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L.
RaFoum (forthcoming 1996) (proposing the reform of jury selection procedures).
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but generally jury selection proceeds as
follows. A panel of potential jurors (the venire) is summoned into the
courtroom for questioning by the court and litigants (voir dire). The
court typically inquires into the general background of the jury panel-
ists: residential area, occupation, marital status, and prior jury service.
Then the litigants question the panelists, probing for any biases that
could have a bearing on the case. Following the examination of the jury
panelists, the litigants exercise challenges for cause14 by asking the court
to exclude certain jury panelists for specific, legally recognized reasons.
The grounds for challenges for cause are usually statutorily enumerated
and often include actual bias (a jury panelist admits during questioning
that he or she cannot be fair and impartial in the particular case),' 5
implied bias (familial or business ties exist between a jury panelist and
one of the litigants or witnesses), 16 and disqualifications based on citi-
zenship, age, residence, and English language ability.17 Following the
exercise of unlimited challenges for cause, the litigants exercise their
peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges differ from challenges for
cause in two respects. Peremptory challenges are limited in number,"
and they do not require the litigant to articulate a reason for excluding
a particular jury panelist.
19
The peremptory challenge serves at least four widely recognized
purposes. First, the peremptory challenge allows the litigants to "elimi-
nate extremes of partiality" on the venire.' Accordingly, at least in
theory, the peremptory challenge operates to secure the litigants a fair
and impartial jury.21 Second, the peremptory challenge gives the parties
14. A challenge for cause allows a litigant to exclude a demonstrably biased or otherwise
unqualified jury panelist from the jury during jury selection.
15. See, e.g., CAR. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 225(b)(1)(C) (West 1996).
16. See, e.g., CAI. CiV. PROC. CODE §§ 225(b)(1)(B), 229 (West 1996).
17. See, e.g., CAR. Crv. PROC. CODE §§ 203, 225(b)(1)(A) (West 1996).
18. See, e.g., CAI. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231 (West 1996) (allowing the prosecution and
the defense twenty peremptory challenges each in cases involving the possibility of
a life or death sentence and ten peremptory challenges each for other cases). See also
4 WiLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws oF ENGItND 347 (Dawsons
of Pall Mall 1966) (1769) (observing that peremptory challenges must have "some
reasonable boundary" and noting that the common law allowed a prisoner thirty-
five such challenges).
19. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (describing the "essential nature of
the peremptory challenge" as "one exercised without a reason stated").
20. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
21. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 91 (observing that peremptory challenges "traditionally have
been viewed as one means of assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased
[Vol. 3:369
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some control over the jury selection process and thereby enhances the
litigants' confidence in the proceedings and respect for the jury's ulti-
mate verdict.22 Third, the peremptory challenge permits litigants to
probe for biases during voir dire without fear of alienating a potential
juror.' 3 Even if no grounds for a challenge for cause appear, the litigant
can exercise a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror who may have
been antagonized by the litigant's questioning. Fourth, the peremptory
challenge serves as a safety net when the jury panelist harbors bias, but
the challenge for cause cannot satisfactorily be demonstrated.24
jury"). See also Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power, " 27
STAN. L. Rav. 545, 550-51 (1975) (advocating the expansion of voir dire); Stephen
A. Saltzburg & Mary E. Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between Impar-
tiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. Ray. 337, 341-42 (1982) (criticizing
constitutional restrictions on the exercise of peremptory challenges).
22. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630 (observing that "the role of litigants in determining the
jury's composition provides one reason for wide acceptance of the jury system and
of its verdicts"); Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (observing that the "function of the
challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure
the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of
the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise."). See also BLACKSTONE, supra
note 18, at 347 (emphasizing "that a prisoner ... should have a good opinion of
his jury"); Babcock, supra note 21, at 552 (observing that "the peremptory challenge
teaches the litigant, and through him the community, that... [the jury's] decision
should be followed because in a real sense the jury belongs to the litigant: he
chooses it."); Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 21, at 356 (observing that the provi-
sion of peremptory challenges, allowing the litigant to remove unwanted jury
panelists, is a means of insuring that a litigant has "a good opinion of the jury");
Underwood, supra note 12, at 771 (observing that the peremptory challenge pro-
vides the litigant "an opportunity to participate in the construction of the decision-
making body").
23. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219-20 (noting the possibility of incurring a jury panelist's
hostility during voir dire); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) (quot-
ing Blackstone regarding the need to exclude jury panelists offended by voir dire).
See also BLAcmrONE, supra note 18, at 347 (observing that "the bare questioning
[of a jury panelist's] indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment"); Babcock,
supra note 21, at 554-55 (recognizing the need to exclude jury panelists alienated
by voir dire); Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 21, at 356 (observing that extensive
voir dire regarding possible biases can alienate a jury panelist); The Supreme Court,
1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARv. L. Rnv. 163, 247 (1992) (observing that
inquiries into potential bias can insult and alienate jury panelists).
24. See Babcock, supra note 21, at 549-50 (describing the reluctance of judges to find
bias and grant challenges for cause); Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 21, at 355-56
(describing jury panelists as reluctant to admit bias and judges as reluctant to find
bias); Underwood, supra note 12, at 771 (describing the peremptory challenge as
.an essential fallback for use when a challenge for cause is rejected").
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Prior to Batson, in Swain v. Alabama,2 5 the United States Supreme
Court condoned the exercise of group-based peremptory challenges,
including peremptory challenges based on race.26 In Swain, the black
male defendant demonstrated that there were eight blacks on his venire
but that none actually served, two being exempt and six having been
challenged peremptorily by the prosecutor during jury selection." The
defendant claimed that the prosecutor had purposely excluded the black
jury panelists in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.28 The Court,
however, declined to hold that purposely excluding black jury panelists
in a particular case violates the Equal Protection Clause.2' Instead, it
reasoned that "[i]n the quest for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro
and white, Protestant and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged
without cause."3 Indeed, the Court reasoned that the pluralistic nature
of American society necessitated the opportunity to make race-based
peremptory challenges.3 Of course, since Swain, the Court has recon-
sidered its position on the subject of race-based peremptory challenges
in a particular case.
In Batson, the Court held that purposely excluding black jury
panelists in a particular case violates the Equal Protection Clause.3 2 In
Batson, the defendant, a black man, objected when the prosecutor used
his peremptory challenges to exclude all four black persons on the
venire, leaving an all white jury.33 Batson was framed in terms of a
criminal defendant's equal protection right not to have members of the
defendant's race excluded because of their race.3 Subsequent cases,
however, framed the issue in terms of the right of jury panelists not to
be excluded because of their race,35 a right that could be asserted by a
25. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
26. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220-21.
27. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205.
28. Swain, 380 U.S. at 210.
29. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221, 223. However, the Court observed that the prosecutor's
exclusion of black jury panelists in case after case such that no black panelist ever
serves on a jury would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.
30. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221.
31. Swain, 380 U.S. at 218, 222.
32. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
33. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-83.
34. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86.
35. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 48-49 (prohibiting a criminal defendant's exercise of race-
based peremptory challenges); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618-19 (prohibiting a civil
litigant's exercise of race-based peremptory challenges); Powers, 499 U.S. at 406-09
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litigant on behalf of the excluded jury panelist(s)." For example, Powers
makes clear that race cannot serve as a proxy for determining juror bias
or competence.37 J.E.B. holds that gender cannot serve as a proxy for
determining juror bias or competence. 8 In contrast to Swain, the Court
in both Batson and J.E.B. reasoned that the pluralistic nature of our
society requires the prohibition of race- and gender-based peremptory
challenges, respectively.
39
J.E.B. clarified the reach of Batson's prohibition.40 In J.E.B., the
Court compared the history, nature, and extent of women's exclusion
from American political life to that of African Americans. The opinion
cited laws specifically excluding women and compared them to laws
specifically excluding African Americans. 4' The laws at issue deprived
women of various rights associated with citizenship, such as jury
service,4 2 voting, holding political office, bringing suit, and owning
(prohibiting the prosecutor's race-based peremptory challenges even when the
excluded jury panelist and the objecting defendant do not share the same race).
36. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 55-56 (holding that the state has standing to challenge a
criminal defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges); Edmonson, 500
U.S. at 628-30 (holding that a civil litigant has standing to challenge an opposing
litigant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges); Powers, 499 U.S. at 410-15
(holding that a white criminal defendant has standing to challenge the state's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude black jury panelists).
37. Powers, 499 U.S. at 410.
38. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
39. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 (noting that "[i]n view of the heterogeneous population of
our Nation, public respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will
be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because
of his race"); J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430 (observing that "[wihen persons are exclud-
ed from participation in our democratic processes solely because of race or gender,
th[e] promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial system is jeopar-
dized"). See also Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630-31 (admonishing that, "[i]f our society
is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the
automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress"); Nancy S. Marder,
Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 Tax. L. REv.
1041, 1083 (1995) (observing that peremptory challenges based on group identity
are inconsistent with democratic ideals).
40. The reasoning in Batson is somewhat obscure, perhaps because the defendant-
petitioner, apparently discouraged by the Court's equal protection clause analysis in
Swain, based his claim on the Sixth Amendment; as a result, the briefs and argu-
ment failed to develop an equal protection analysis. Batson, 476 U.S. at 112-18
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
41. J.EB., 114 S. Ct. at 1425.
42. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422-24.
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property.4 3 The Court reasoned that, under equal protection analysis, this
history of exclusion required the heightened scrutiny of gender-based
discrimination." The Court concluded that gender-based peremptory
challenges could not survive the heightened scrutiny.45 Although histori-
cally men have been favored for inclusion on juries and in other aspects
of American political life, the Court in JE.B. made clear that they, like
women, are a cognizable group and that the state's intentional exclusion
of them from the jury panel violates the Equal Protection Clause.46 The
Court also made clear, however, that peremptory challenges may be
exercised to "remove from the venire any group or class of individuals
normally subject to 'rational basis' review."47 The Court cited occupa-
tion-based challenges as an example of permissible group-based discrimi-
nation in the exercise of peremptory challenges.
48
Post-Batson and its progeny, a litigant may not exercise race- or
gender-based peremptory challenges. If a litigant establishes a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury selection, 9 the opponent
must articulate a race- or gender-neutral reason for excluding the jury
panelist(s),"0 a burden of proof scheme based on Tide VII disparate
43. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1425 (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685
(1973)).
44. J.E.B., 114 S. Cr. at 1425.
45. J.EB., 114 S. Ct. at 1425-30 (assessing whether gender discrimination in jury
selection substantially furthers the state's legitimate interest in a fair and impartial
jury and concluding that it does not).
46. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428. While the result may seem absurd (forbidding the
purposefil exclusion of male jury panelists when it is women who historically have
been excluded from American political life), it stems from the Court's focus on
discrimination as opposed to subordination. The Court apparently believed that
affording women protection from gender-based peremptory challenges but not
extending the same protection to men would deny men the equal protection of the
laws. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 423-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. J.E.B., 114 S. Cr. at 1429.
48. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 n.14.
49. In deciding whether the litigant has established the requisite prima facie case, "the
trial court should consider all relevant circumstances." Bason, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
For example, if a litigant and the excluded jury panelist share a common racial
identity, this shared racial identity may raise the necessary inference of purposeful
discrimination. Powers, 499 U.S. at 416. In any event, the litigant objecting to the
peremptory challenge is entitled to "rely on the fact, as to which there can be no
dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits
'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.'" Batson, 476 U.S. at 96
(quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
50. Purkert v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1770 (1995). But see Stephen R. DiPrima, Note,
Selecting a Jury in Federal Criminal Tials After Batson and McCollum, 95 COLUM.
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treatment cases.51 Assuming the facial validity of the opponent's expla-
nation,52 the trial court determines whether the litigant opposing the
peremptory challenge(s) has carried his or her burden of proving pur-
poseful discrimination. 53 The trial court can find that a facially valid
explanation is a pretext for purposeful discrimination.
54
Batson jurisprudence has had its critics. The dissenting and con-
curring justices in Batson and its progeny spotlight the pedigree of the
peremptory challenge and extol its role in securing a fair and impartial
jury.55 These critics lament that despite the history and function of the
peremptory challenge, Batson and its progeny restrict the exercise of
peremptory challenges to prevent the intentional exclusion of certain
groups from juries.5' They also predict that Batson's implementation
L. Ray. 888, 904 (1995) (observing that trial courts frequently require an explana-
tion for peremptory challenges without analyzing whether the objecting party has
demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination).
51. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973)).
52. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771 (rejecting the notion that the proffered neutral
explanation must be persuasive or plausible, because that would shift the burden of
persuasion regarding racial motivation from the opponent to the maker of the chal-
lenge(s)).
53. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1770-71. A showing of disproportionate impact in the
absence of purposeful discrimination will not suffice to show a Batson violation.
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362 (1991) (upholding the exclusion of
bilingual jurors even though the exclusion would have a disproportionate impact on
Latino jury panelists). However, disproportionate impact may evidence purposeful
discrimination. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363.
54. Purkett, 115 S. Cr. at 1771. See also David A. Sutphen, Note, True Lies: The Role of
Pretext Evidence Under Batson v. Kentucky in the Wake of St. Mary's Honor Center
v. Hicks, 94 MicH. L. Rav. 488, 506-10 (1995) (arguing that at least in the Batson
context, proof of pretext should be treated as the legal equivalent of proof of
purposeful discrimination).
55. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that the "peremp-
tory's importance is confirmed by its persistence: it was well established at the time
of Blackstone and continues to endure in all the States"); id. at 1439 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing Batson jurisprudence as a "vandalizing of our people's
traditions"); Batson, 476 U.S. at 112, 118-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (lamenting
that "the Court sets aside the peremptory challenge, a procedure which has been
part of the common law for many centuries and part of our jury system for nearly
200 years"); id. at 137 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (declining to "subscribe to the
Court's unprecedented use of the Equal Protection Clause to restrict the historic
scope of the peremptory challenge"). For a history of the peremptory challenge, see
Swain, 380 U.S. at 212-19.
56. Batson, 476 U.S. at 125 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (observing that "[pleremptory
challenges have long been viewed as a means to achieve an impartial jury that will
be sympathetic toward neither an accused nor witnesses for the State on the basis of
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will fail. Specifically, critics assert that Batson: interjects racial matters
into the jury selection process;57 diminishes the ability of litigants to act
on sometimes accurate group-based assumptions (stereotypes); 51 forces
"'the peremptory challenge to collapse into the challenge for cause;'59
effectively abolishes the peremptory challenge;60 and lengthens trials that
are already too long.
6 1
Their appeal to history in defense of the peremptory chal-
lenge (versus Batson) seems wrongheaded. Because blacks and women
some shared factor of race, religion, occupation, or other characteristic"); id. at 138
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observing that the "use of group affiliations, such as age,
race, or occupation, as a 'proxy' for potential juror partiality, based on the assump-
tion or belief that members of one group are more likely to favor defendants who
belong to the same group, has long been accepted as a legitimate basis for the state's
exercise of peremptory challenges").
57. Batson, 476 U.S. at 129 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
58. JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that "like race,
gender matters," but J.E.B. renders "any correlation between a juror's gender and
attitudes ... irrelevant as a matter of constitutional law"); Batson, 476 U.S at
138-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing group affiliations, including race, as
a legitimate proxy for potential juror partiality in the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges).
59. Batson, 476 U.S. at 127 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. v. Clark, 737 E2d
679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984)).
60. Powers, 499 U.S. at 425 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that the prohibition on gender-based discrim-
ination in jury selection means "a step closer to eliminating the peremptory chal-
lenge"). Some legal commentators have joined the Justices in their more extreme
assertions about Batson's effect on the peremptory challenge. See, e.g., J. Christopher
Peters, Note, Georgia v. McCollum: It' Strike Three for Peremptory Challenges, But
is it the Bottom of the Ninth? 53 LA. L. REv. 1723, 1757 (1993) (asserting that
"under the strictures imposed by the Court, peremptory challenges have oudlived
their usefulness"); Susan A. Winchurch, Note, J.E.B. v. Alabama ew reL T.B.: The
Supreme Court Moves Closer to Elimination of the Peremptory Challenge, 54 MD. L.
Ray. 261, 262-63 (1995) (asserting that "the Court's extension of Batson principles
to gender-based peremptory challenges has compromised the peremptory challenge
to such a degree that it is no longer an effective litigation tool"). But see
Underwood, supra note 12, at 768-73 (arguing that Batson limits but does not
destroy the value of the peremptory challenge).
61. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing Batson mini-
hearings as "routine"); Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that Batson and
its progeny spawn "extensive collateral litigation"); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 645
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "the amount of judges' and lawyers' time devoted
to implementing [Batson and its progeny] will be enormous" and that "[t]hat time
will be diverted from other matters"); Batson, 476 U.S. at 126 n.7 (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting) (predicting that voir dire will become "'Tide VII proceeding[s] in
miniature'") (quoting Clark, 737 F.2d at 682).
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historically were excluded from jury service, the use of peremptory
challenges to exclude them as jurors was formerly simply not an issue.
6 2
Once blacks and women began to serve as jurors, the peremptory
challenge assumed a new and historically unprecedented role as an
instrument of race and gender discrimination. Perhaps the peremptory
challenge was unquestioned in an earlier society with different values, a
society in which only affluent white males sat on juries.6 3 Contemporary
American society apparently values more heterogeneous juries.6 4 The use
of peremptory challenges to exclude certain groups from juries renders
the prospect of heterogeneous juries elusive, perpetuates stereotypes and
prejudices, and subordinates socially significant minority groups.
65
Similarly, to say that Batson interjects race into the jury selection process
misses the point. The exercise of race-based peremptory challenges
interjects race into the jury selection process.
66
The balance of the assertions by Batson critics are not so easily
dismissed. Batson and its progeny arguably diminish the ability of
litigants to act on sometimes accurate group-based assumptions. Con-
curring in J.E.B., Justice O'Connor observed the following:
62. SeeJ.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428 n.15 (recognizing that various traditions, like "de jure
segregation and the total exclusion of women from juries, are now unconstitutional
even though they once co-existed with the Equal Protection Clause"); Toni M.
Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and
Procedures, 64 N.C. L Rav. 501, 504-10 (1986) (showing how the jury and jury
selection have changed over time); Marder, supra note 39, at 1093-94, 1096-98
(showing that who can serve on the American jury has changed only recently).
63. Until the mid-twentieth century, jury lists in most jurisdictions contained only the
names of affluent white men. PAULA DIPERNA, JuRuas ON TRAL 80 (1984). See also
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153, 165 (1989)
(observing that peremptory challenges historically determined "which members of a
reasonably elite group of propertied men served on juries"); Akhil Reed Amar,
ReinventingJuries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAvis L. Ray. 1169, 1183 (1995)
(describing the peremptory challenge as a "relic of an imperfectly democratic past"
and arguing that it has outlived its purpose given that jury pools are no longer
homogeneous); Marder, supra note 39, at 1094 (describing the jury as formerly a
"preserve of white, male property owners").
64. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
65. SeeJE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427-28, 1430.
66. The argument that Batson has interjected race into the jury selection process is
reminiscent of the argument that affirmative action has stigmatized and demeaned
its intended beneficiaries. "[A]ffirmative action did not cause stigma to attach to
selected racial groups; society already had taken care of that." John E. Morrison,
Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the RbetoricAgainstAffirmative
Action, 79 Iowa L. REV. 313, 343 (1994).
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like race, gender matters.... [O]ne need not be a sexist to
share the intuition that in certain cases a person's gender and
resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her view of
the case. "Jurors are not expected to come into the jury box
and leave behind all that their human experience has taught
them."
67
The majority opinion does not contest the observation that race and
gender matter; it merely prohibits a litigant from acting on race- or
gender-based assumptions to strike jurors.68 In the case of each individ-
ual jury panelist for whom the opponent demonstrates a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination, information or observations gained
from voir dire (apart from the excluded jury panelist's race or gender)
must evidence the jury panelist's partiality or prejudice or otherwise
support a permissible reason for excluding the jury panelist.69 The
reason: race and gender may matter, but the reason that they may
matter-centuries of discrimination and subordination based on these
characteristics-makes exclusion from jury service based on race or
gender particularly intolerable.7" Moreover, while race and gender may
matter, how they matter is often unknowable. Race and gender charac-
teristics may interact with each other (the essence of intersectionality)
and with a host of other characteristics, like age, income, occupation,
education, political affiliation, and religion, to make any one character-
istic an unreliable indicator of bias.7
For instance, a male defendant in a sexual harassment case could
assume that women as a group are more likely than men to have
67. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980)).
68. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427 n. 11 (acknowledging that a "shred of truth may be con-
tained in some stereotypes" but asserting, nevertheless, that state actors must "look
beyond the surface before making judgments about people that are likely to stigma-
tize as well as to perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination").
69. SeeJ.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429 (observing that "voir dire can inform litigants about
potential jurors, making reliance upon stereotypical and pejorative notions about a
particular gender or race both unnecessary and unwise"). See also Edmomon, 500
U.S. at 631 (observing that a litigant's belief that a prospective juror harbors biases
"can be explored in a rational way.., without the use of classifications based on
ancestry or skin color").
70. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
71. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 512 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Marder,
supra note 39, at 1081 (rejecting the idea that "people can[ ] be reduced to one
characteristic").
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suffered sexual harassment, and that women who have suffered sexual
harassment would be biased in favor of the female plaintiff. Defense
counsel might therefore seek to exclude women jury panelists. However,
in the case of any individual woman panelist, the opposite could just as
well be true. For instance, polls conducted during the Clarence Thomas
confirmation hearings demonstrated that women who have been
harassed may be skeptical of another woman's claims.7 Professor
Martha Minow considers the possibilities:
Perhaps the complainant did not respond the way the adjudi-
cator did or would have; perhaps the complainant appears
disloyal or otherwise blameworthy in the eyes of the adjudica-
tor. These alternatives simply point to the multiple directions
that bias may take, but not to its absence. Would restricting
decisionmaking to a man or group of men be any better?73
The answer is that the bias of male jury panelists in a sexual harassment
claim may also run in multiple directions:
[Men] might identify with the accused and might worry
about being accused themselves. They might worry about false
accusations and the difficulty of rebutting them. They might
worry about true accusations, yet not believe them serious
enough to warrant public sanction. They also might worry
about true accusations and seek to show their ability to over-
come any appearance of bias by coming down hard on the
accused.74
For the same reason, it would be overly simplistic to assume that
black jurors are biased in favor of other blacks and therefore exclude
black jury panelists in a case involving a black defendant. While some
members of minority groups may be sympathetic to members of their
own group, others "respond to discrimination and prejudice by at-
tempting to disassociate themselves from the group, even to the point
of adopting the majority's negative attitudes towards the minority."75 In
72. Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1201, 1208 (1992)
(citing Felicity Barringer, Hill's Case is Divisive to Women, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 18,
1991, at A12).
73. Minow, supra note 72, at 1208.
74. Minow, supra note 72, at 1208-09.
75. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing
social science evidence at nn.2-3). Professor Babcock cites the 1969 criminal trial of
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addition, blacks sometimes witness and are victimized by black-on-black
crime and as a result may actually be prejudiced against the black
defendant. For example, a black woman juror, commenting on jury
service in the District of Columbia, made the following observation:
Some defense lawyers may feel that the predominantly
middle aged, predominantly black jury most often chosen
in the District is more sympathetic to the black defen-
dant. But they are espousing ... another bit of folklore.
In fact, quite the opposite is true. Enough crime is
enough, such juries feel. We are the victims. You see it
on the unsigned exit questionnaires handed out at
month's end in the early-sunset wintertime. "Give us
more protection walking from the Courthouse to the
bus." Or "This is a high crime neighborhood; don't hold
us in the court past dark."76
If working properly, then, the post-Batson peremptory challenge
functions as follows. Assume a charge of battery on a law enforcement
officer. The defense is self-defense in response to the use of unreason-
able force by the law enforcement officer. The defense would exercise
its challenges to exclude law enforcement officers, the friends and
relatives of law enforcement officers, and anyone who might be per-
ceived as a "law-and-order" type. The prosecution would exercise its
peremptory challenges to exclude anyone who has had a bad experience
with law enforcement officers, the friends and relatives of others who
have had negative experiences with law enforcement officers, and "any-
one who might be perceived as an "anti-establishment" type. Once each
side exercises its peremptory challenges, what theoretically would remain
is an impartial jury, 7 composed of panelists who have had no personal
21 Black Panthers on multiple charges of violent crimes in New York for the
proposition that "black males as a class can be biased against young alienated blacks
who have not tried to join the middle class.. . ." Babcock, supra note 21, at 553.
In that litigation, the defendants challenged "about as many" black jury panelists as
did the prosecution. Babcock, supra note 21, at 553 n.30.
76. Carl H. Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Democratic Institution, 6 Loy.
LA. L. Rav. 247, 258-59 (1973) (citing Natalie Davis Spingarn, Eye the Juy, THE
WASHINGrON POST, Sept. 10, 1972, at 16).
77. Proponents of the peremptory challenge system value the ignorance or "impartiality"
of jurors, jurors who will be free from "bias" to base their decision on the evidence
presented by the parties at trial. Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury,
70 IND. L.J. 405, 428-34 (1995). This model, however, is arguably flawed. It
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experience or familiarity with police brutality or law enforcement.
78
What litigants cannot do after Batson is to exclude black or any other
race of jury panelists on the assumption that they are biased in favor of
assumes that truth is objective and that the human observer and external world are
separable. Modern cognitive theory posits different conceptions of truth and the
human observer:
the mind has come to be seen not as a mirror reflecting exact images of
reality, but as a lens through which external reality is refracted.... All
experience is mediated by preexisting knowledge structures, constellations
of assumptions, interests, and purposes that filter and organize perception
as it occurs. And because the minds that take the world in are a product
of their time and place, their representations of reality are likewise socially
conditioned and partial to some degree....
... Because all perception is dependent on the interpretive apparatus
of the observer, truth is invariably relative to a community that shares the
same conventions of interpretation. No perspective can claim priority on
the basis of privileged access to the truth.
Cammack, supra, at 416-17, 420. See also Minow, supra note 72, at 1208 (advocat-
ing a collaborative decision-making process based on the inclusion of multiple
perspectives); MA. Widder, Student Commentary, Neutralizing the Poison ofJuror
Racism: The Need fr a Sixth Amendment Approach to Jury Selection, 67 TUL L. REv.
2311, 2324-25 (1993) (advocating the "well rounded" jury).
The modern conceptions of truth and the human observer do not support
excluding the biased as peremptory challenges do, for everyone is biased. Instead,
they support including as many perspectives as possible, provided that the jurors are
"willing to suspend judgment, to attempt to see things from another perspective,
and to learn." Cammack, supra, at 485. As Professor Martha Minow puts it:
None of us can know anything except by building upon, challenging,
responding to what we already have known, what we see from where we
stand. But we can insist on seeing what we are used to seeing, or else we
can try to see something new and fresh. The latter is the open mind we
hope for from those who judge, but not the mind as a sieve without prior
reference points and commitments.
Minow, supra note 72, at 1217.
78. In reality, "in a diverse society the peremptory challenge is actually a stacking tool
that favors majority interests while handicapping the party who would benefit from
minority representation on the jury." Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection:
A New Response to Peremptory Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. Rnv. 781, 800 (1986).
Stacking can occur because in all jurisdictions, peremptory challenges are limited in
number. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. If a jury panel is likely to have
more "law-and-order" types than "and-establishment" types, the likelihood is that
the prosecutor will be able to eliminate the "anti-establishment" types, but the
defense will not be able to eliminate the "law-and-order" types.
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the defendant or prejudiced against law enforcement. However, assum-
ing no showing of pretext to discriminate against black jury panelists,
litigants could lawfully exclude panelists who have had negative experi-
ences with law enforcement officers, even if that process excluded all
black jury panelists.7 9
Thus, Batson theoretically diminishes the ability of parties to act on
sometimes accurate group-based assumptions, but the cost to the parties
perceived by Batson critics is somewhat elusive. Batson critics assume
that the group-based assumption is empirically accurate, that the indi-
vidual jury panelist fits the group-based assumption, and that the
panelist's bias will not be exposed during voir dire. 0 Any one of these
assumptions might not hold true. If the group-based assumption is not
empirically accurate, if an individual jury panelist does not fit the
stereotype, or if the jury panelist's bias is exposed during voir dire, then
the litigant who would otherwise rely on the stereotype loses nothing.
Batson critics also assert that the post-Batson peremptory challenge
has collapsed into the challenge for cause or has been effectively abol-
ished."1 Batson and its progeny undeniably alter the exercise of the
peremptory challenge. Because the challenge for cause requires a litigant
to articulate a basis for excluding a jury panelist, the hallmark of the
pre-Batson peremptory challenge was the ability to exclude a jury panel-
ist without articulating a reason. 2 Batson and its progeny restrict the
use of the peremptory challenge insofar as a litigant cannot exclude jury
panelists on the basis of race or gender. Additionally, Batson works a
change in the exercise of peremptory challenges insofar as a litigant
must articulate the basis for his or her peremptory challenges when the
79. To exclude these jurors, however, is arguably to exclude a black perspective on
police conduct. Inclusion advocates would argue that this exclusion undermines
truth-seeking insofar as it excludes this black perspective. Only the elimination of
peremptory challenges could prevent this sort of exclusion.
80. Dissenting in J.E.B., Justice Scalia opined that even expanded voir dire would not
help litigants to select a fair and impartial jury in a post-Batson trial: "[the biases
that go along with group characteristics tend to be biases that the juror himself does
not perceive, so that it is no use asking about them. It is fruitless to inquire of a
male juror whether he harbors any subliminal prejudice in favor of unwed fathers."
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438-39. However, assuming that subliminal prejudice cannot
be demonstrated, do we allow parties to assume bias and exclude on the basis of
race and gender? The answer of Batson and its progeny is clear: such assumptions
should not be tolerated.
81. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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opponent establishes a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.
s3
Nevertheless, Batson states that while a litigant cannot rebut a prima
facie case of discrimination "merely by denying that he had a discrimi-
natory motive or 'affirming his good faith in making individual selec-
tions, ' ' 4 "the [litigant's] explanation need not rise to the level justifying
exercise of a challenge for cause."
5
Since the Batson critics are far removed from the trial court proce-
dures that they have condemned, I explored their more extreme asser-
tions about the demise of the peremptory challenge and Batson's burden
on the courts in a survey of state and federal trial lawyers. Specifically,
in the summer of 1994, I drafted and distributed a written survey 6 to
664 San Diego trial attorneys, 7 including: 92 Assistant U.S. Attor-
neys-Criminal Division, 259 Deputy District Attorneys, 65 Deputy
City Attorneys-Criminal Division, 23 Federal Public Defenders, 195
Deputy Public Defenders, and 30 Alternate Public Defenders."8 These
trial attorneys received surveys because their names appeared on the
attorney rosters of the various agencies.
Of the 664 surveys sent, 197 anonymous surveys were returned in
pre-addressed, pre-stamped return envelopes. 9 Of the 197 returned
surveys, 98 were completed by prosecutors, 96 by defense attorneys,
and 3 by attorneys who did not identify themselves as either prosecu-
tors or defense attorneys. 90 Of the 197 returned surveys, 9 were com-
pleted by exclusively federal court practitioners, 150 were completed by
exclusively state court practitioners, and 36 were completed by lawyers
83. See supra notes 49-50.
84. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (citing Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
85. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
86. See Appendix A for the survey. Of course, surveys rely on self-reporting to gather
information, and the value of survey research is highly dependent on the reliability
of the survey subjects. Successful survey research depends on the survey subject
being knowledgeable, self-aware, honest, and cooperative. The results of survey
research should be considered with this limitation in mind.
87. The survey was distributed to criminal law practitioners in public service because
these practitioners typically have substantial trial experience and are easy to identify
on various agency rosters.
88. Alternate Public Defenders handle cases, primarily conflicts of interest, which are
not accepted by the Public Defender.
89. The returned surveys are on file with Professor Montoya. See Appendix A, Ques-
tion 16, asking responding attorneys to describe their professional experience. See
Appendix B, Table 1, for a profile of the attorneys who returned the survey.
90. For unknown reasons, not all questions were answered on a few of the returned
surveys.
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who had practiced in both federal and state courts. The lawyers who
responded to the survey had extensive trial experience: 20 had conduct-
ed 0-10 trials, 30 had conducted 11-25 trials, 66 had conducted
26-50 trials, 50 had conducted 51-100 trials, and 29 had conducted
over 100 trials. Significantly, 23 of the lawyers with federal court
experience spent some time practicing pre-Batson and 73 of the lawyers
with state court experience spent some time practicing pre-Wheeler
(California's Batson counterpart). 9' These lawyers therefore were able to
compare pre- and post-Batson and pre- and post-Wheeler practice,
respectively.
The surveyed attorneys were asked, among other things, to indi-
cate: the value of peremptory challenges to litigants; 92 whether peremp-
tory challenges were of any more value pre-Batson or pre-Wheeler (for
attorneys practicing in California's state courts);93 how often a Batson or
Wheeler motion had been made in cases which they had personally
tried;94 and whether Batson/Wheeler motions consumed too much court
time.95 The surveyed attorneys were also asked to explain particular
answers.
96
91. Predating Batson, the California Supreme Court had distinguished peremptory chal-
lenges based on "specific bias" from challenges based on "group bias" in Wheeler,
583 P.2d at 760-61. In that case, the court defined specific bias as a bias relating to
the particular case on trial and defined group bias as the presumption that certain
jurors are biased merely because of their membership in an identifiable group distin-
guished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 761.
Wheeler held that the use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on
the basis of group bias violated the state constitutional right to trial by a jury drawn
from a representative cross-section of the community. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 761-62.
Like Batson, however, Wheeler held that a showing of specific bias could support a
peremptory challenge. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 762.
Some legal scholars and commentators have advocated the applicability of the
Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement to the government's discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges in jury selection. See, e.g., Marder, supra note 39, at
1128-34, 1138; Massaro, supra note 62, at 536-39; Widder, supra note 77, at
2331-32. However, the Court has limited the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section
requirement to the empaneling of jury venires. Holland, 493 U.S. at 478.
92. See Appendix A, Questions 1 and 2.
93. See Appendix A, Questions 3 and 4.
94. See Appendix A, Question 5.
95. See Appendix A, Question 6.
96. The answers to relevant survey questions were assigned a numerical value and two
formulas were used to determine statistical significance: the t-test for those questions
asking respondents to choose from four or more possible answers, and a Chi Square
test for those questions asking respondents to choose from three or fewer possible
answers. See DuN J. CHAMPION, BAsIc STATISTICS FOR SociAL RESEARcH 171-76,
234-39, 243-46 (2d ed. 1981).
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Of the 193 lawyers who answered the question regarding the value
of peremptory challenges,97 157 (81.35%) 9' described peremptory
challenges as being of great value. An additional 35 (18.13%) described
peremptory challenges as being of some value. Only one attorney
described peremptory challenges as having no value. When asked to
explain the value of peremptory challenges, lawyers most frequently
cited the following reasons: to exclude a juror with whom the attorney
has "bad chemistry;" to exclude jurors on the basis of "gut feeling;" to
exclude the "screwballs;" to exclude jurors when challenges for cause
should have been granted but were not; to exclude jurors with attitudes
and experiences that would not support a challenge for cause but which
support an inference of bias against the client or the client's case theory;
to exclude jurors on the basis of unprotected group membership (e.g.,
occupation); to skew the panel in the client's favor; to allow the lawyer
and client some control over the composition of the jury; and for
prosecutors who must obtain a unanimous verdict, to shape a working
group of jurors. Lawyers indicating that peremptory challenges have only
"some value" often commented that time and other constraints on the
examination of the panelists limited the lawyer's ability to discover biases.
Thus, despite the constitutional restrictions on the exercise of
peremptory challenges, and despite the impressions of the Batson critics,
practitioners overwhelmingly described peremptory challenges as valu-
able. 9 Moreover, prosecutors and defense attorneys generally shared this
view, as did federal court and state court practitioners. 100
In the related question of whether peremptory challenges were of
any more value pre-Batson or pre-Wheeler,101 75 (56.82%) said that they
97. See Appendix B, Table 2, for a detailed breakdown of the responses to this ques-
tion.
98. All percentages are based on the total number of attorneys answering the particular
question.
99. See Appendix B, Table 2.
100. Regarding the value of peremptory challenges, 81 (82.65%) of the prosecutors
thought that peremptory challenges were of great value, 74 (80.43%) of the defense
attorneys thought they were of great value, 120 (82.19%) of the state court practi-
tioners thought they were of great value, and 30 (83.33%) of the lawyers who had
practiced in both federal and state courts thought they were of great value. In
contrast, only 5 (55.56%) of the federal court practitioners thought that they were
of great value. The sample of exclusively federal court practitioners was small,
however; and the balance of the federal court practitioners, 4 (44.44%), thought
that peremptory challenges were of some value.
101. See Appendix B, Table 3, for a detailed breakdown of the responses to this ques-
tion.
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were equally valuable, 30 (22.73%) said that they had been slightly
more valuable, and 21 (15.91%) said they had been significantly more
valuable. Only 6 (4.55%) said that they had been less valuable. Howev-
er, the lawyers who practiced pre-Batson or pre- Wheeler attributed more
value to the pre-Batson and pre-Wheeler peremptory challenge. Of the
lawyers practicing pre-Batson in federal courts, only 8 (42.11%) thought
that peremptory challenges were equally valuable today, 7 (36.84%)
thought that they had been slightly more valuable, and 2 (10.53%)
thought that they had been significantly more valuable. Of the lawyers
practicing pre-Wheeler in state courts, only 33 (47.83%) thought that
peremptory challenges were equally valuable today, 18 (26.09%)
thought that they had been slightly more valuable, and 15 (21.74%)
thought that they had been significantly more valuable. Thus, 47.37%
of the pre-Batson attorneys and 47.83% of the pre-Wheeler attorneys
recognized that the peremptory challenge depreciated in value following
Batson and Wheeler, respectively, while only 38.64% of the general
population of surveyed attorneys recognized the depreciation of the
peremptory challenge.1
02
Lawyers provided telling reasons for assigning a particular value to
pre-Batson and pre-Wheeler peremptory challenges. The reasons most
often cited by lawyers assigning a higher value to these challenges
included the following: the lawyer did not have to explain any challeng-
es; the lawyer could challenge jurors on the basis of race and sex (e.g.,
"there is obviously a tendency for people to sympathize with those from
the same race"); less questioning was necessary to remove a juror;
Batson deters even non-discriminatory challenges that lawyers will not
be able to explain (i.e., because they are based on gut feeling); lawyers
now take more notes during voir dire and spend more time comparing
the responses of jurors;0 3 and lawyers' discretion has been curtailed.
102. The difference between pre-Wheeler and post-Weeler attorneys reached statistical
significance. Attorneys who practiced pre-Weeler were more likely to say that
peremptory challenges had more value pre-Wheeler. The difference between defense
attorneys and prosecutors also reached statistical significance. Prosecutors were more
likely to say that peremptory challenges had more value pre-Batson and pre-Wheeler.
103. This response probably reflects the fact that, although a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation is fairly easy to explain away, trial courts may conclude that the explanation
is pretextual if the lawyer excluding the subject jury panelist(s) fails to exclude other
jury panelists who share the objectionable characteristic (e.g., blacks with facial hair
are excluded but whites with facial hair are not). See Michael J. Raphael & Edward
J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations under Batson v. Kentucky, 27
U. MICH. J.L. REP. 229, 239, 243, 254, 260-61, 264 (1993) (examining how lower
courts have evaluated neutral explanations in Batson hearings).
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The lawyers who stated that peremptory challenges are equally valuable
today cited the following reasons: Batson motions are rarely granted,
leaving peremptory challenge practice virtually unchanged; 04 the lawyer
has never exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race or sex;
and as defense attorneys, they typically have no interest in challenging
panelists who belong to one of the cognizable groups.
Although the lawyers who practiced pre-Batson and pre-Wheeler
were more likely to recognize the depreciation of the peremptory
104. Justice Marshall predicted that Batson would not end race discrimination in jury
selection, in large part because a trial court -would have difficulty assessing a lawyer's
motives in excluding the subject jury panelist(s). Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-07
(Marshall, J., concurring). Many legal scholars and commentators have echoed
Justice Marshall's views. See, e.g., Deborah L. Forman, What Difrence Does It
Make? Gender and Jury Selection, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 59-64 (1992) (discuss-
ing the problem of pretextual explanations); Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves
Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REv.
1807, 1830-31 (1993) (observing that Batson "invites any inventive prosecutor to
create subterfuges"); Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer
Peremptory: Batson s Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination From
Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. Rav. 625, 633 (1994) (observing that Batson cannot
prevent "clever lawyers" from engaging in unlawful discrimination in jury selection);
Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic
Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1,
44-47 (1988) (observing that "any thoughtful prosecutor can sufficiently disguise
racial discrimination with racially-neutral reasons"); Karen M. Bray, Comment,
Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. Ruv.
517, 543 (1992) (describing "rubber stamp" approvals of explanations that "cripple"
Batson); Stacy A. Dowling, Note, 25 SETON HALL L. Rav. 756, 786 (1994) (arguing
that Batson is rendered "meaningless" by the litigants' ability to "mask the real
reasons for their strikes"); Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson s Invidious Legacy: Discrimi-
natory Juror Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REv.
336, 362-63 (1993) (observing that Batson is "little more than a test of the prose-
cutor's creativity"); Widder, supra note 77, at 2326-27 (describing Batson as
nothing more than a "symbolic denunciation of racial discrimination by lawyers").
Case studies also support Justice Marshall's prediction that incredible excuses for
prima facie discriminatory challenges would be proffered by lawyers and accepted by
courts. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury
Selection: Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 511, 583-96 (using
the reported decisions of the 'lower federal courts to demonstrate that these courts
rarely find Batson violations and overwhelmingly accept proffered neutral reasons);
Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 103, at 235 (examining 824 primarily appellate
court opinions applying Batson procedures in the first five years after Batson and
concluding that prosecutors who want to rebut a prima facie case of illegal discrimi-
nation in jury selection do not face a significant challenge); Eric N. Einhorn, Note,
Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B.: Is the Peremptory Challenge
Still Preeminent? 36 B.C. L. REv. 161, 187-96 (1994) (surveying federal appellate
court decisions and discussing proffered neutral explanations with skepticism); Swift,
supra, at 357-61 (surveying federal appellate court decisions and concluding that
"soft-data" reasons are impossible to evaluate).
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challenge following Batson and Wheeler, these lawyers described the
current value of the peremptory challenge in terms comparable to the
general population of surveyed lawyers.'0 5 Of the 23 lawyers practicing
pre-Batson, 19 (82.61%) thought that peremptory challenges were of
great value, 3 (13.04%) thought that they were of some value, and only
1 (4.35%) thought that they were of no value. Of the 71 lawyers
practicing pre-Wheeler, 57 (80.28%) thought that peremptory challenges
were of great value, 14 (19.72%) thought that they were of some value,
and none thought that they were of no value.
Thus, not only did the general population of surveyed trial lawyers
highly value the current peremptory challenge, but lawyers who current-
ly practice and also practiced pre-Batson and pre- Wheeler indicated that
they highly value the current peremptory challenge. These lawyers
continue to value the peremptory challenge despite the constitutional
limits imposed on the challenge. Given that the state court practitioners
have been living with Wheeler since 1978 and therefore have substantial
experience with the limits that Wheeler and its progeny impose on jury
selection, these results are particularly significant. Moreover, that the
post-Batson peremptory challenge continues to be valuable to trial
lawyers disproves the Batson critics' more extreme claims. Batson has not
forced the peremptory challenge to collapse into the challenge for cause
and has not effectively abolished the peremptory challenge.
In addition to reaching unfounded conclusions about Batson's
effects on the peremptory challenge, some of Batson's critics have con-
demned Batson for prolonging trials.106 To test the validity of this
criticism, the survey inquired into the burden associated with the imple-
mentation of Batson and its progeny.
According to the surveyed trial lawyers, Batson and Wheeler are
infrequently invoked, 0 7 and when invoked, the motions do not take up
too much court time.0" When asked how often Batson or Wheeler
motions were made by the attorney, co-counsel, or the opposition
attorney in cases personally tried by the surveyed attorney, only 2 of
195 attorneys (1.03%) said that such motions were made in all cases,
and 10 (5.13%) said that such motions were made in most cases.
105. See Appendix B, Table 2.
106. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
107. See Appendix B, Table 4, for a detailed breakdown of the responses to this
question.
108. See Appendix B, Table 5, for a detailed breakdown of the responses to this
question.
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Notably, 133 (68.21%) said that such motions were made in only some
cases, and an additional 50 (25.64%) said that they were never made.
Moreover, prosecutors and defense attorneys largely shared this view.
10 9
When asked if BatsonlWheeler motions take up too much court
time, 158 of 182 attorneys (86.81%) thought that they did not, and 24
(13.19%) thought that they did. Interestingly, prosecutors and defense
attorneys answered this question somewhat differently: 65 of 87 prose-
cutors (74.71%) thought that these motions did not take up too much
court time, and 22 (25.29%) thought that they did, while 90 of 92
defense attorneys (97.83%) thought that these motions did not take up
too much court time, and only 2 (2.17%) thought that they did.' The
difference between prosecutors and defense attorneys' responses may
result from the fact that defense attorneys bring these motions more
often than do prosecutors."' Defense attorneys who make these mo-
tions would be unlikely to think (or say) that they burden the system.
The results of the survey thus challenge and refute the criticisms
directed against Batson and its progeny. Fears that Batson would change
the nature of the peremptory challenge, deter its use, effectively collapse
it into the challenge for cause, and excessively prolong jury trials appear
alarmist in the face of the data. Given the continued vitality of the
peremptory challenge and the apparent viability of the Batson
109. A group of 96 prosecutors shared the view of the general population of surveyed
lawyers: 1 (1.04%) said that such motions were made in all cases, 7 (7.29%) said
that they were made in most cases, 55 (57.29%) said that they were made in only
some cases, and 33 (34.38%) said that they were made in no cases. A group of 96
defense attorneys arguably perceived more motion activity. Of 96 defense attorneys,
1 (1.04%) said that such motions were made in all cases, 2 (2.08%) said that they
were made in most cases, 77 (80.21%) said that they were made in some cases, and
only 16 (16.67%) said that they were made in no cases.
110. The difference between prosecutors and defense attorneys' responses reached statisti-
cal significance. Prosecutors were more likely to say that BatsonlWheeler motions
took up too much court time. The difference between lawyers practicing pre- and
post-Batson in federal courts also reached statistical significance. Lawyers with pre-
Batson experience were more likely to say that the motions took up too much court
time. Notably, however, the difference between lawyers practicing pre- and post-
Wheeler in state courts did not reach statistical significance, although it was dose.
Of 70 pre-Wheeler attorneys, 20% thought that the motions took up too much
court time, while only 8.51% of 94 post-Wheeler attorneys thought so. Perhaps
examination of a larger pre- and post-Batson pool of attorneys would similarly not
reach statistical significance.
111. See DIPERNA, supra note 63, at 154 (observing pre-Batson that protests to race-based
peremptory challenges "have been mostly defense complaints objecting to prosecuto-
rial behavior" and that "peremptory challenge abuse is most widespread although
not confined to prosecutors").
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procedures, we can assume that the two will continue to coexist.112
Assuming that the peremptory challenge and Batson will continue to
coexist, Batson's scope must be considered.
II. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND INTERSECTIONALITY
Distinct from purposeful race or gender discrimination is purpose-
fil intersectional discrimination: discrimination targeting a particular
combination of race and gender (e.g., African American women or
Latino men). Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to
address the issue, purposeful intersectional discrimination in jury selec-
tion occurs and has arisen as an issue before state and lower federal
courts."' United States v. Nichols"4  illustrates the problem of
intersectional discrimination in jury selection.
In Nichols, the defendant complained that the government had
exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude all black females from the
jury."5 The venire consisted of thirty-seven persons, eight of whom
were black." 6 Although one black man was challenged for cause, three
black men served on the jury.117 The government exercised four of its
seven peremptory challenges to exclude the four black women on the
venire."' Nichols objected to each of these challenges, noting that his
only witness was a black woman and that the government's witnesses
were white." 9 Nichols also noted that there was speculation that the
juror who had hung the jury in the first trial of the same case was a
112. See Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal To Eliminate Racially Dicriminatory
Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CriM. L. Rv. 1099, 1132 (1994) (observing
that "nothing ... in the Batson line suggests that the Court is actually likely to
abolish the peremptory challenge soon").
113. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 804 E2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1037 (1987) (regarding the exclusion of black men); People v. Motton, 704
P.2d 176 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (regarding the exclusion of black women); People v.
Washington, 628 N.E.2d 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), appeal denied, 649 N.E.2d 424
(III. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 203 (1995) (regarding the exclusion of black
men); State v. Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 806 P.2d 65
(1991) (regarding the exclusion of Latino men); People v. Garcia, 636 N.Y.S.2d
370 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (regarding the exclusion of black women).
114. 937 E2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1080 (1992).
115. Nichols, 937 E2d at 1260.
116. Nichols, 937 F.2d at 1262.
117. Nichols, 937 E2d at 1262-63 & n.2.
118. Nichols, 937 E2d at 1263.
119. Nichols, 937 E2d at 1263.
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black woman. ° These facts support an inference that the prosecutor
purposely excluded the intersectional group of black women. Neverthe-
less, the court declined to find a Batson violation.
12 1
The existence of intersectional discrimination in jury selection
raises the question: what, if anything, should be done about it? Courts
considering this question have provided different answers. The follow-
ing discussion attempts to bring some coherence and insight to the
subject.
A. Recognizing Peremptory Challenges Based on Intersectional Status
as Impermissible Intersectional Discrimination
One approach to the problem treats peremptory challenges based
on intersectional status as a distinct category of group-based challenges.
The question becomes whether intersectional status is like race and
gender, an impermissible proxy for bias, or like occupation, the sort of
group-based proxy for bias that remains permissible following Batson.
Given this approach to the problem of intersectional discrimination
in jury selection, one argument is that intersectional status is unlike race
and gender since the same history of exclusion, at least as evidenced by
laws, is arguably lacking for intersectional groups. That is, while laws
may have targeted women and African Americans for exclusion from
American political life, laws arguably have not targeted African Ameri-
can women or other intersectional groups for exclusion. Arguably, if no
such history of exclusion exists, then intersectional groups are not
entitled to heightened scrutiny and the use of peremptory challenges to
exclude them is permissible. Pre-J.E.B., in United States v. Dennis,1 12 the
Eleventh Circuit declined to recognize black males as a cognizable
group for Batson purposes for precisely this reason.
123
In Dennis, the defendants, who were black, objected when the
government used peremptory challenges to strike three black males from
120. Nichols, 937 F.2d at 1263.
121. The court declined to extend Batson to gender-based discrimination and declined to
recognize black women as a cognizable group. Nichols, 937 F.2d at 1262. Accord-
ingly, the court limited its inquiry to the issue of racial discrimination. Nichols, 937
F.2d at 1262. However, if black women were targeted for exclusion by the prosecu-
tion, then racial discrimination necessarily occurred. See injra part II.B.
122. 804 E2d 1208 (1986).
123. Dennis, 804 E2d at 1210.
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the jury panel.'24 Two black women sat on the jury that convicted the
defendants. 2 5 On appeal, the defendants urged the court to recognize
black males as a cognizable group.'26 Declining to do so, the Eleventh
Circuit defined a cognizable group as "'one that is a recognizable,
distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as
written or as applied."' 27 The court asserted that the defendants failed
to show that black males constituted a distinct, recognizable subclass of
individuals, historically singled out for different treatment under the
laws not simply as blacks, but as black males. 2  The court reasoned
that it therefore would be "inappropriate" to narrow the cognizable
group to include only black males and exclude black females.'
2 9
Dennis, however, can be criticized on at least two grounds. First,
the court's analysis begs the question. If the Dennis defendants were
correct, the prosecution's exclusion of black males but not black females
constituted a singling out of a recognizable, distinct class for different
treatment under the peremptory challenge laws as applied. Second, to
the extent that evidence of historical exclusion from American political
life (as distinct from exclusion in the particular case) is the relevant
concern for the courts, the United States Supreme Court has
documented a long history of intersectional discrimination. Indeed, the
case law is replete with references to statutory and constitutional laws
advantaging white males to the exclusion of all other intersectional
groups in such areas as jury service, voting,"' holding political
124. Dennis, 804 E2d at 1209.
125. Dennis, 804 E2d at 1209.
126. Dennis, 804 E2d at 1210.
127. Dennis, 804 F.2d at 1210 (citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494).
128. Dennis, 804 E2d at 1210.
129. Dennis, 804 F.2d at 1210.
130. See, e.g., Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 387-88 (1880) (regarding an 1848
Delaware statute); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879) (regarding
an 1873 West Virginia statute); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434,
443 (1871) (regarding a Territory of Missouri law).
131. See, e.g., Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 376, 382-83 (1915) (regarding the
Maryland constitution adopted in 1867); Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S.
135, 167, 171-72 (1892) (regarding the Territory of Michigan constitution adopted
in 1835, and 1856 and 1862 Territory of Nebraska statutes); Hannibal v,
Fauntleroy, 105 U.S. 408, 412 (1881) (regarding an 1851 Hannibal, Missouri city
law); Neal 103 U.S. at 387 (regarding the Delaware constitution adopted in 1831);
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 64-65 (1867) (regarding the Georgia
constitution adopted in 1865); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 270,
277 (1821) (regarding 1802 and 1812 Congressional acts governing elections in
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office, 132 militia service,133 and land grant eligibility13 4-significant
incidents of American citizenship. After J.E.B., the identification of
cognizable groups for Batson purposes begins with a showing that a
group has been historically excluded from American political life. 135 It
follows from the pervasiveness of laws exclusively advantaging the
intersectional group of white males that the other intersectional groups,
such as African American women and Latino men, should enjoy
protection from discrimination in jury selection.
36
If the Court nevertheless declined to recognize that intersectional
groups have been the target of discriminatory laws, the Court could still
conclude that Batson prohibits intersectional discrimination. The Court
in J.E.B. recognized that discriminatory laws historically targeted wom-
en and racial and ethnic minorities.137 These laws undeniably have
created social cross-currents 138 as old as the laws themselves. These
social cross-currents support treating intersectional status the same way
race and gender are treated under equal protection analysis.
Washington, D.C.). See also Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 395 (1866)
(observing that "[t]he constitutions of nearly all the States require as a qualification
for voting that the voter shall be a white male citizen").
132. Boyd, 143 U.S. at 170-71, 172 (regarding 1854 and 1856 Territory of Nebraska
laws); Cohens, 19 U.S. at 277, 279 (regarding an 1812 Congressional act governing
elections in Washington, D.C.).
133. See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 420, 587 (1856) (regarding a
1792 Congressional act); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 330, 331 (1806)
(regarding an 1803 Congressional act).
134. See, e.g., Hall v. Russell, 101 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1879) (regarding an 1850 Con-
gressional act); Morton v. Nebraska, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 660, 662 (1874) (regarding
an 1854 Congressional act); Silver v. Ladd, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 219, 220 (1868)
(regarding an 1850 Congressional act).
135. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
136. Of course, white males would also enjoy that protection. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
138. The concept of social cross-currents is illustrated well by an analogy to traffic in an
intersection. Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory andAntiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHi. LE AL F. 139, 149 [hereinafter Demarginalizing the Intersec-
tion of Race and Sex]. The black experience (in part the product of discriminatory
laws) flows in one direction and women's experience (also in part the product of
discriminatory laws) flows in another, but at the intersection of these two experienc-
es is the unique experience of black women. The intersection down the road, where
the black experience intersects with men's experience, will have its own unique
attributes.
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Professor Kimberld Crenshaw has demonstrated that
intersectionality is a condition of social and historical significance.
Professor Crenshaw proclaims that the "intersectional experience" of
African American women is "greater than the sum of racism and sex-
ism." 139 She argues that "dual vulnerability does not simply mean that
our burdens are doubled but instead, that the dynamics of racism and
sexism intersect in our lives to create experiences that are sometimes
unique to us."' She makes this point by showing that feminist theory
is typically grounded in white women's experience, and thereby
marginalizes black women:
Statements such as "men and women are taught to see men as
independent, capable, powerful; men and women are taught
to see women as dependent, limited in abilities, and passive,"
are common within this literature. But this "observation"
overlooks the anomalies created by crosscurrents of racism and
sexism. Black men and women live in a society that creates
sex-based norms and expectations which racism operates si-
multaneously to deny; Black men are not viewed as powerful,
nor are Black women seen as passive.... Given this under-
standing, perhaps we can begin to see why Black women have
been dogged by the stereotype of the pathological matriarch
or why there have been those in the Black liberation move-
ment who aspire to create institutions and to build traditions
that are intentionally patriarchal."'
She further illustrates this point by noting that "Black women have
traditionally worked outside the home in numbers far exceeding the
labor participation rate of white women." 142 Thus, Professor Crenshaw
demonstrates that the African American woman's life experiences will
often differ from the experiences of both African American men and
white women.
Professor Crenshaw was not the first to make this observation.
Over a hundred years ago, at an 1851 women's rights conference,
139. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 138, at 140.
140. Kimberlk Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1467,
1468 (1992).
141. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 138, at
155-56.
142. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 138, at 156.
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Sojourner Truth responded to arguments that women were "too frail
and delicate to take on the responsibilities of political activity" by
declaring:
Look at my arm! I have ploughed and planted and gathered
into barns, and no man could head me-and ain't I a wom-
an? I could work as much and eat as much as a man-when
I could get it-and bear the lash as well! And ain't I a wom-
an? I have born thirteen children, and seen most of 'em sold
into slavery, and when I cried out with my mother's grief,
none but Jesus heard me-and ain't I a woman?'43
Recent empirical research demonstrates the continued social signifi-
cance of intersectionality, not only for African American women but for
other intersectional groups as well. For example, one recent study
reveals that white women, black men, and black women cannot buy the
same car for the same price as can white men using identical bargaining
strategies. 4' In this study, the final offers given white females reflected
forty percent higher markups than those given white males, and final
offer markups for black males were twice as high and for black females
three times as high as that for white males.'45 The researcher also ob-
served that the race and gender discrimination in retail car sales was
"synergistic or 'superadditive,"' that is, the discrimination against black
females was greater than the combined discrimination against both
white females and black males.'
4 6
Various economic measures also indicate that intersectional status
can mean real differences in material conditions. 4 7 For instance, while
only 9.8% of white men lived in poverty in 1991, 12.7% of white
women did, 26.2% of Hispanic men did, 28.5% of black men did,
143. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 138, at 153
(citing ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS MoVE-
MENT IN THE UNIrrTD STATES 91 (1975) and BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN
159-60 (1981)).
144. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations,
104 HAnv. L. REv. 817, 821-22 (1991).
145. Ayres, supra note 144, at 819, 828.
146. Ayres, supra note 144, at 829.
147. It can be argued that the cause of the various socioeconomic conditions discussed
here is uncertain; however, one would expect that second-dass citizenship, produced
by laws excluding groups from American political life, would be reflected in de-
pressed socioeconomic conditions for these groups.
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31.2% of Hispanic women did, and 36.5% of black women did.' 48
Similarly, median earnings varied depending on intersectional status.
While the median earnings of white men working full-time, year-round,
in 1991 was $30,266, the median earnings of black men was $22,075,
the median earnings of white women was $20,794, the median earnings
of Hispanic men was $19,771, the median earnings of black women was
$18,720, and the median earnings of Hispanic women was $16,244.149
Accordingly, assuming that African American women and other
intersections of race and gender have not been specifically excluded from
American political life by historically discriminatory laws, 150 they arguably
have been uniquely affected by the social cross-currents of widely recog-
nized race- and gender-based laws. If so, intersectional status would be
similar enough to the status of race and gender that it should be treated
similarly and enjoy the same protection from purposeful discrimination
in jury selection. At least the California Supreme Court seems to agree.
In People v. Motton,"' defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's
exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude black women and blacks
generally from the jury.'52 When defense counsel first objected, the
prosecutor had exercised eight peremptory challenges-four against
black women, and one against a black man-leaving no blacks on the
panel. 53 The California trial court denied the defendant's motion for
relief, concluding that counsel had failed to make out a prima facie case
of discriminatory exclusion. 15 The prosecutor subsequently exercised
five more peremptory challenges, one against a black man and another
against a black woman. 155 Defense counsel again objected to no avail." 6
Both the prosecution and defense assumed that no blacks were seated
on the jury as finally selected; however, it was later "discovered" that a
black woman had served on the jury.
157
148. CHERYL RussELL & MARGARET AMBRY, THE OFFIcIAL GUIDE TO AMERICAN IN-
COMES 283 (1993).
149. RussELL & AMBRY, supra note 148, at 51-52.
150. I argue otherwise. See supra notes 130-136 and accompanying text.
151. 704 P.2d 176 (Cal. 1985).
152. Motton, 704 P2d at 177.
153. Motton, 704 P2d at 178, 180.
154. Motton, 704 P.2d at 178.
155. Motton, 704 P.2d at 179, 180.
156. Motton, 704 P2d at 179.
157. Motton, 704 P2d at 179 n.*. The court noted that the true racial identity of the
challenged jurors was less important than their apparent racial identity, since
"discrimination is more often based on appearances than verified racial descent."
Motton, 704 P.2d at 180.
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In addressing defense counsel's objection to the prosecutor's exclu-
sion of black women, the trial court asked counsel: "What's so mag-
ic[al] about Black women? ... I'd like to hear from you what it is
about the Black women that has some special quality in it ... You
have got women on the jury. What function does a Black woman fulfill
that the White woman doesn't?" 15" Defense counsel responded by
describing black women as a group involving a unique "concurrence of
racial and sexual identity."159 Defense counsel's apparent tactic was to
cast the prosecutor's exclusion of black women from the jury as an
illegal exclusion on the basis of group bias.
160
The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction in Motton,
holding that both blacks generally and black women are cognizable
groups and that the defendant had established a prima facie case of
discriminatory exclusion on both grounds.'61 In holding that black
women are a cognizable group, the court observed that "black women
face discrimination on two major counts-both race and gender-and
their lives are uniquely marked by this combination."'62 The court
further observed that
It is not a question of the merits of one group in contrast to
another. At the very core of Wheeler is the notion that diver-
sity '[in] beliefs and values [that] jurors bring from their
group experiences' must be encouraged in order '... to
achieve an overall impartiality' in their decision-making pro-
cesses.
163
The court explained that it was not assuming that black women jurors
would necessarily vote the same way,1" but rather that their inclusion
on the jury "'enhance[s] the likelihood that the jury will be representa-
tive of significant community attitudes."' 165 The court further found
that their exclusion from the jury "'deprives the jury of a perspective on
158. Motton, 704 P.2d at 178.
159. Motton, 704 P.2d at 178.
160. See supra note 91.
161. Motton, 704 P2d at 183.
162. Motton, 704 P.2d at 181.
163. Motton, 704 P2d at 181-82 (quoting Wheeler, 583 E2d at 761).
164. Motton, 704 P2d at 182.
165. Motton, 704 P.2d at 181 (quoting People v. Harris, 679 P.2d 433, 441 (Cal. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984)).
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human events that may have unsuspected importance in a[ ] case."'166
In sum, jury deliberations stand to gain from the inclusion of black
women and suffer from their exclusion.
B. Recognizing Peremptory Challenges Based on Intersectional
Status as Impermissible Race and Gender Discrimination
If "[c]ategories [and subcategories] have meaning and consequenc-
es,"' 67 as Motton acknowledges, we should recognize them for purposes
of defining unconstitutional jury selection and should extend Batson to
forbid discrimination on the basis of intersectional status. However,
even if courts refuse to recognize peremptory challenges based on
intersectional status as a distinct category of group-based challenges,
there is another approach to the problem of intersectional discrimina-
tion in jury selection. Instead of arguing that Batson extends to
intersectional discrimination, it could be argued that no extension of
Batson is necessary because intersectional or race and gender discrimina-
tion is necessarily race discrimination and gender discrimination. In
State v. Gonzales,6 ' the appellate court of New Mexico apparently
applied this approach.
During the first day of jury selection in Gonzales, the prosecutor
used three of his five available peremptory challenges to exclude His-
panic men from the jury.169 During the second and final day of jury
selection, the prosecutor used all five of his available peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude Hispanic men from the jury.170 In terms of race and
ethnicity, the jury ultimately selected by this process consisted of four
Hispanics, one Native American, and seven Anglos.' 7 ' In terms of
gender, the jury consisted of eleven women and one man.172 Both
defendants, like the excluded jurors, were Hispanic men. 73 The defen-
dants objected to the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory
166. Motion, 704 P.2d at 182 (quoting Justice Marshall in Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493,
503-04 (1972)).
167. Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionaliy, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. Rav. 1241, 1297 (1993).
168. 808 P.2d 40 (N.M. App. 1991).
169. Gonzales, 808 P.2d at 43.
170. Gonzales, 808 P.2d at 43.
171. Gonzales, 808 P.2d at 43.
172. Gonzales, 808 P.2d at 43.
173. Gonzales, 808 E2d at 49.
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challenges to exclude Hispanics, and particularly Hispanic men, from
the jury.'74 The trial court denied the defendants' motion for relief.
175
The New Mexico appellate court concluded that the defendants
had established a prima facie case of discriminatory exclusion of His-
panics generally"7 and Hispanic men in particular.177 The opinion
noted that the New Mexico Supreme Court had adopted the Wheeler
doctrine in interpreting the right to a jury trial in New Mexico.
171
Citing Motton,17 9 the court found the exclusion of Hispanic men to be
discriminatory. Citation to Motton notwithstanding, however, it is not
clear that the New Mexico appellate court shared the Motton court's
appreciation of intersectionality.
Gonzales lacks Motton's acknowledgment that the combination of
race and gender gives rise to a unique human experience of social-
historical import. In Gonzales, the court did not find that Hispanic men
are a unique, cognizable group. Instead, the court concluded that
"Hispanics and men are cognizable groups."8 0 On the basis of that
conclusion, the court remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing
on whether the prosecution had used its peremptory challenges to
exclude jurors "on the basis of their race or gender."' The court added
that if the exclusion of jurors occurred "on the basis of either their race
or their gender or both," the defendants' convictions were to be re-
versed.'82 However, even when the court refers to the exclusion of
jurors "on the basis of either their race or their gender or both," nothing
about the "both" suggests a special category meriting protection as such.
At most, Gonzales reads as if Hispanic men, both as Hispanics and as
men, are entitled to protection from exclusion on the basis of their
"race or gender." The "both" merely acknowledges the possibility that
the prosecution impermissibly excluded the Hispanic men on two
independent, impermissible bases: their race and their gender.
Judge Murnaghan, dissenting, makes a similar point in United
States v. Hamilton."3 In Hamilton, the government exercised seven
174. Gonzales, 808 P.2d at 43.
175. Gonzales, 808 P.2d at 43.
176. Gonzales, 808 P2d at 46-47.
177. Gonzales, 808 P.2d at 50.
178. Gonzales, 808 P.2d at 48.
179. Gonzales, 808 P.2d at 49.
180. Gonzales, 808 P.2d at 50.
181. Gonzales, 808 P.2d at 50 (emphasis added).
182. Gonzales, 808 P.2d at 50.
183. 850 E2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed sub nom. Washington v. United
States, 489 U.S. 1094 (1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990).
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
peremptory challenges to exclude seven black jury panelists,184 but only
three of those challenges were at issue on appeal. 185 The government
had directed these three challenges against black women and had of-
fered the same explanation for each of the three challenges: the exclud-
ed jury panelists were female.186 Of the twelve jurors eventually seated,
six were white women, three were black women, and three were white
men. l8 ' In this pre-J.E.B case, the 4th Circuit declined to extend
Batson to gender-based discrimination and accepted the government's
explanation as a race-neutral, albeit troubling, explanation."' In con-
trast, Judge Murnaghan emphasized that the prosecution challenged
black women panelists while not challenging white women panelists'89
and observed that the government's discrimination "if sexual, [was] also
indubitably racial." 190 Judge Murnaghan reasoned that the government's
sex discrimination did not excuse conduct that was "racially as well as
sexually discriminatory."' 9' The judge insisted that the conduct had to
be viewed as "racially and sexually discriminatory" and not "either
racially or sexually discriminatory." 192 Thus, applying reasoning similar
to that in Gonzales, Judge Murnaghan found that discrimination against
black women constituted both race and sex discrimination.
After JE.B. the point is simple: two wrongs do not make a right.
A litigant who purposely excludes black males from the jury panel,
purposely excludes blacks and purposely excludes men from the jury,
and both exclusions are illegal. 19 If a jury panelist would not have been
excluded but for his or her race (as, for example, when black men are
excluded but white men are not) or but for his or her gender (as, for
example, when black men are excluded but black women are not), then
184. Hamilton, 850 E2d at 1039.
185. Hamilton, 850 E2d at 1041.
186. Hamilton, 850 E2d at 1041.
187. Hamilton, 850 E2d at 1041.
188. Hamilton, 850 E2d at 1042.
189. Hamilton, 850 F2d at 1043 (Murnaghan, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
190. Hamilton, 850 E2d at 1044 (Murnaghan, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
191. Hamilton, 850 E2d at 1044 (Murnaghan, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
192. Hamilton, 850 E2d at 1044 (Murnaghan, Circuit Judge, dissenting).
193. The California Supreme Court made a similar point in Moton, when it noted that,
"[e]ven if Black women were not a cognizable group, the systematic exclusion of
Black women would inevitably result in disproportionate underrepresentation of
Black persons generally on the jury." Moton, 704 P.2d at 182 n.2.
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both impermissible race and gender discrimination have occurred.'
94
This approach to intersectional discrimination, apparently applied in
Gonzales, holds true whether or not one recognizes the subcategory of
black males as a cognizable group for Batson purposes, as Motton appar-
ently would.
C Recognizing Intersectional Discrimination in Jury Selection
as the More Compelling Approach to Peremptory
Challenges Based on Intersectional Status
Although discrimination based on intersectional status is rightly
considered race and gender discrimination, Batson should be extended
to forbid intersectional discrimination. Litigants sometimes do direct
their peremptory challenges at the intersection of race and gender, and
these challenges are no more supportable than challenges directed solely
at race (African Americans), solely at gender (women), or simultaneous-
ly at both race and gender (African Americans and women). In the
analogous context of Title VII litigation, legal scholars
195 and courts' 96
194. Similar reasoning should apply in the "mixed motive" context; that is, when a jury
panelist is excluded for permissible and impermissible reasons. Thus, in Riley v.
Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 508 (Va. Ct. App. 1995), the court held that the
prosecutor's exclusion of older women was impermissibly based on gender and
violated J.E.B. See also Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977) (regarding mixed motive in the employment discrimina-
tion context).
195. See, e.g., Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 138,
at 149-50; Judy Trent Ellis, Sexual Harassment and Race: A Legal Analysis of Dis-
crimination, 8 J. LEGIS. 30, 32 (1981); Elaine W. Shoben, Compound Discrimi-
nation: The Interaction of Race and Sex in Employment Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 793, 834-35 (1980); Judith A. Wmston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: Title VII,
Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990,
79 CAL. L. Rav. 775, 796-801 (1991). For a comparison of traditional, reformist,
and critical race theory analyses of Tide VII claims based on intersectional discrimi-
nation, see Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical-
Liberal Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference? 82 CAL. L. REV.
787, 832-39 (1994) (conduding that critical race theory has not contributed a
perspective on Tide VII intersectionality claims that substantially differs from that
offered by the reformists).
196. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 E2d 1025, 1032
(5th Cir. 1980); Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 779-80 (D.D.C. 1986);
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 944 n.34 (D. Neb. 1986),
affd, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987) (reh'g denied, 840 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1988);
Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984). See also
Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561, 566 (4th Cir. 1985) (assuming that
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have generally supported the recognition of claims based on
intersectional discrimination.
Indeed, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the spirit of
Batson and its progeny with the abandonment of jury panelists who
suffer discrimination because of their intersectionality. Reflecting its
specific facts, Batson used the term "cognizable racial group[s]" and
required the defendant to show that the "prosecutor" had exercised
peremptory challenges to exclude from the venire "members of the
defendant's race." 197 However, Batson was grounded on the Equal
Protection Clause in the spirit of ending invidious discrimination in jury
selection. Because the Equal Protection Clause is to be construed liberal-
ly,198 the Court has since extended Batson to gender-based peremptory
challenges, 199 to challenges made by private, civil litigants and criminal
defendants, 00 and to race-based challenges whether or not the defendant
and the excluded jurors share the same race.201 That is to say, Batson has
been read broadly to provide litigants and jury panelists protection from
discriminatory jury selection. Courts should read Batson similarly broadly
when analyzing peremptory challenges based on the intersectional status
of the jury panelist.
Certainly, black feminist jurisprudence supports the recognition of
intersectionality by rejecting the idea of compartmentalized identity and
advancing the idea of indivisible identity. For instance, Professor Regina
Austin poses the following satirical questions:
When was the last time someone asked you to choose be-
tween being a woman and being a minority person or asked
you to assess the hardships and the struggles of your life in
terms of your being a woman on top of being black (or what-
ever color you are) or a black on top of being a woman, as if
black women are a protected dass without addressing the issue of intersectionality).
But see DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 145
(E.D. Mo. 1976), affd in part and rev'd in part, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977)
(asserting that "[t]he prospect of the creation of new classes of protected minorities,
governed only by the mathematical principles of permutation and combination,
dearly raises the prospect of opening the hackneyed Pandora's box.").
197. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (emphasis added).
198. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307.
199. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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being a woman or being black were like icing on a cake? As if
you and your kind were not an integrated, undifferentiated,
complete whole.
2 02
Professor Angela Harris similarly rejects the idea of black women
as "women plus,"203 the idea that "'Black women are... white women
with color.'" 2 4 She describes the compartmentalization of identity as a
form of violence to black women:
The result of essentialism is to reduce the lives of people who
experience multiple forms of oppression to addition problems:
"racism + sexism = straight black women's experience ......
Thus, in an essentialist world, black women's experience will
always be forcibly fragmented before being subjected to analy-
sis, as those who are "only interested in race" and those who
are "only interested in gender" take their separate slices of our
lives. 205
Finally, the recognition and prohibition of intersectional discrimi-
nation in jury selection does not destroy the peremptory challenge as a
valuable litigator's tool. The two can and do coexist despite assertions
to the contrary, most notably those made in People v. Washington.
20 6
At approximately 2:30 a.m., the defendant, Artra Washington went
to the home of his wife's grandmother, knocked on her door, and
screamed. 0 7 According to the grandmother's testimony, she told the
defendant that his wife and children were not staying with her, and the
defendant left.28 The defendant returned at approximately 4:00 a.m.,
and again screamed for his wife and children.2 9 Anthony, one of the
grandmother's sons, chased the defendant with a pool stick and used
202. Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539, 540 (advancing and apply-
ing black feminist jurisprudence).
203. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 SAN. L. Ray.
581, 598 (1990).
204. Harris, supra note 203, at 601 (quoting Barbara Omolade, Black Women and Femi-
nism, in THE FtrrEu op DIFFERENCE 247, 248 (H. Eisenstein & A. Jardine eds.,
1980)).
205. Harris, supra note 203, at 588-90 (recognizing that categorizing is necessary but
advocating a jurisprudence based on "multiple consciousness").
206. 628 N.E.2d 351 (1993).
207. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 353.
208. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 353.
209. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 353.
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the pool stick to break the defendant's front windshield.2 0 The defen-
dant left.21' At approximately 5:30 a.m., the defendant returned and
broke the grandmother's windshield. The defendant also pulled a
shotgun out of his car and fired two shots at the grandmother's
house.213 Both shots hit Terrance, one of the grandmother's grandchil-
dren, and Terrance died.214 According to the defendant's testimony, he
returned to the grandmother's house because he was mad and did not
believe that his family was not in her house.2 15 He further testified that
he had brought the gun for protection and fired it because he saw
Anthony running toward him with "a club."216 The defendant was
charged with Terrance's death and was convicted of first-degree mur-
der.
217
In Washington, the state used four of its peremptory challenges
after the first panel of fourteen jury panelists was questioned.218 Two of
those challenges were exercised against black men.219 The defendant, a
black male,220 objected that the state was purposely excluding black
males from the jury.22' The judge overruled the objection.222 The jury
ultimately chosen consisted of six white males, one white female, and
five black females.223
In making the case that the prosecutor had discriminated against
black males during jury selection, the defendant made the following
arguments: the prosecutor peremptorily challenged 100% of the black
males questioned during jury selection; although 8% of the jury panel-
ists were black males, no black males sat on the jury; the white men
accepted as jurors had backgrounds similar to the challenged black
males; he, the defendant, was a black male; and most of the state's
210. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 353.
211. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 353.
212. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 353.
213. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 353.
214. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 353.
215. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 354.
216. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 354.
217. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 354.
218. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 352.
219. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 352.
220. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 356.
221. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 352.
222. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 352.
223. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 352-53.
[Vol. 3:369
1996] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES RE RACE AND GENDER 407
main witnesses were black females.224 The defendant further argued that
the prosecutor's actions exploited the stereotype of the "overbearing
strong matriarchal black woman [who] has emasculated the black man
and made him obsolete as a social member of the family." 2 5 The
prosecutor also obviously exploited the stereotype of the black male as
the derelict father when in summation the prosecutor argued to the jury
that the defendant should not have squandered money on a shotgun
when his family could not even afford a telephone.226 These facts
strongly support the inference that the prosecutor was purposely exclud-
ing black men.
On appeal, the defendant did not argue that the challenged black
males were excluded solely because of their race or solely because of
their sex.227 Instead, the defendant argued that the state excluded black
males because of both their race and their sex, that is, because of their
intersectionality. 228 The state in turn argued that Batson did not extend
to the category of black males. 229 Although the Illinois appellate court
assumed in this pre-JE.B. case that it would be a violation of the
Illinois constitution to challenge potential jurors solely on account of
their gender,"30 the court declined to recognize a claim of intersectional
discrimination.'31
In reaching its conclusion, the court warned that the recognition
of "subcategories of race and gender" would create new hybrid groups,
increase the number of Batson hearings, and effectively destroy the
peremptory challenge and the Batson decision. 232 The court predicted
that defendants would no longer claim simple race discrimination or
gender discrimination because "all challenged jurors could easily fit into
some subcategory.... Establishing a prima facie case of discrimination
224. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 356.
225. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 356.
226. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 359. The defendant argued on appeal that this com-
ment was improper because no evidence had been presented regarding the reason
the defendant's family did not have a telephone. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 359.
The appellate court, however, described the prosecutor's comment as "inconse-
quential and harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 359.
227. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 355-56.
228. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 356.
229. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 355.
230. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 355.
231. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 356.
232. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 356.
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would always be easier when a challenged juror belongs to a subcate-
gory rather than a general category. "233
The argument is a curious one. Washington basically declines to
extend Batson to intersectional discrimination because such an extension
could destroy the peremptory challenge. However, if the elimination of
the peremptory challenge is the price for nondiscrimination in jury
selection, the Constitution requires that we pay that price. As Justice
Marshall, concurring in Batson, observed, "'[w]ere it necessary to make
an absolute choice between the right of a defendant [or prospective
juror] to have a jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the
Constitution compels a choice of the former."' 4 Indeed, the basis of
Justice Marshall's observation is well settled: "peremptory challenges are
not constitutionally protected fundamental rights; rather, they are but
one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury
and a fair trial."235 In any event, applying Batson to intersectional dis-
crimination in jury selection will not destroy the peremptory challenge
as Washington predicts. Rather, the extension of Batson to intersectional
discrimination is fully compatible with the continued existence and vi-
tality of the peremptory challenge.
Recognizing "subcategories of race and gender" arguably could
make it easier to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because
the subcategories of prospective jurors (e.g., black males) would likely
include fewer prospective jurors than the more general categories of
males or blacks. With only one black male on a panel of five males and
four blacks, it would be difficult to show either race or sex discrimina-
tion if the single black male were challenged: only 20% of the males
and 25% of the blacks would have been challenged.3 6 However, if the
233. Washington, 628 N.E.2d at 356.
234. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (quoting Justice Goldberg, dissenting in Swain, 380 U.S. at
244).
235. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 57. See also Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586
(1919) (observing that "nothing in the Constitution of the United States ...
requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges to defendants in criminal
cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured").
236. One method of proving a prima facie case of discrimination is to show that a party
has challenged most or all of the members of a cognizable group. Wheeler, 583 P.2d
at 764; Motton, 704 P.2d at 182. See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (noting that a
"pattern" of strikes may give rise to an inference of discrimination). For a discussion
and critique of the "numbers game" in raising the inference of discrimination in
jury selection, see Serr & Maney, supra note 104, at 27-37.
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category of black males were recognized, the moving party could estab-
lish that 100% of all black males on the panel had been excluded. If, as
a result, a prima facie case of discrimination were demonstrated when it
otherwise would not be, Batson hearings could very well increase. Nev-
ertheless, the litigant claiming a Batson violation must demonstrate a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination." The percentage of any
category or subcategory of jury panelists who are excluded is only one
factor among others that the trial court may consider. Statistical evi-
dence alone is unlikely to support a claim of intersectional discrimina-
tion since the number of jury panelists in any subcategory is likely to
be too small to demonstrate purposeful discrimination.
In fact, while recognizing "subcategories of race and gender" is
unlikely to make it easier to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, the failure to recognize subcategories may make it particularly
difficult to establish discrimination when a jury panelist is excluded
because of his or her intersectional status.23 First, courts may not detect
the race and gender discrimination that occurs when jury panelists are
excluded because of their intersectional status. For instance, the Gonza-
les approach to discrimination in jury selection could result in proof
problems for the Hispanic male defendant who faces a jury of Hispanic
women and white men, the Hispanic men having been excluded by the
prosecutor. The Hispanic male defendant may fail to establish the
requisite prima facie case of purposeful race or sex discrimination to the
court's satisfaction since both Hispanics and men are represented on the
jury, even if Hispanic men are not.239
Second, some courts may not agree that intersectional discrimina-
tion is also race and gender discrimination. In Hernandez v. New
237. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-95.
238. See Christy Chandler, Race, Gende, and the Peremptory Challenge: A Postmodern
Feminist Approach, 7 YALE J.L. & FmmiNsM 173, 183-84 (1995) (arguing that
Batson will fail to protect women of color unless they are recognized as a class).
239. Npvertheless, the Gonzales court found a prima facie case of exclusion based on race
even though four Hispanics sat on the jury. The court reasoned: "[a] single prospec-
tive juror may be stricken for a racially motivated reason and the jury still retain its
'representative' character. This, nevertheless, offends equal protection." Gonzales,
808 P.2d at 45. See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (quoting Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.14 (1977), the Court
observed: "'[a] single invidiously discriminatory governmental act' is not 'immunized
by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable deci-
sions.'").
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York,240 the Court held that the exclusion of Spanish-speaking Latino
jurors who could not unequivocally agree to defer to the official English
translation of Spanish-language testimony did not exclude Latino jurors
in violation of Batson.24' The Court reasoned, in part, that "[e]ach
category [jurors who could unequivocally agree to defer and jurors who
could not] would include both Latinos and non-Latinos."242 In a juris-
diction that does not prohibit intersectional discrimination, a lawyer
who excludes black men could use the Hernandez rationale to argue
that he or she excludes neither on the basis of race nor sex, since each
category [black men and everyone other than black men] will include
both blacks and men. That is, the exclusion of black males is not race
or gender discrimination, because black women and non-black men are
not excluded. In those courts that did not agree that intersectional
discrimination is also race and gender discrimination, intersectional dis-
crimination could serve as a pretext for illegal race and gender dis-
crimination.
24 3
Finally, the attorney survey discussed in Part I dispels the concern
that prohibiting intersectional discrimination will destroy the peremp-
tory challenge and instead demonstrates the feasibility of extending
Batson to intersectional discrimination. The study generally concludes
that trial lawyers value the post-Batson and post-Wheeler peremptory
240. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
241. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 361 (finding race-neutral the prosecutor's explanation for
excluding the Latino jury panelists). The Court's decision generated much contro-
versy. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York. Courts, Prosecutors, and the
Fear of Spanish, 21 HoFs-nA L. REv. 1, 3, 15-21, 44 (1992) (arguing that the
exclusion of bilingual jurors is not race-neutral and should be held to violate the
Equal Protection Clause); Deborah A. Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfran-
chisement ofEthnic Groupsfrom Jury Service, 1993 Wis. L. Rnv. 761, 771-85 (using
psycholinguistic research to demonstrate that Hernandez effectively permits the
exclusion of all Spanish-speaking bilingual jurors in every case where there is likely
to be Spanish language testimony).
242. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 361.
243. In concluding that the Equal Protection Clause forbids gender-based discrimination,
the Court similarly reasoned that, because gender and race are overlapping catego-
ries, gender could be used as a pretext for racial discrimination and effectively
insulate racial discrimination from judicial scrutiny. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430. The
Court noted that "[t]he temptation to use gender as a pretext for racial discrimina-
tion may explain why the majority of the lower court decisions extending Batson to
gender involve the use of peremptory challenges to remove minority women."
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430 n.18. Importantly, the Court apparently assumed that
minority women would be protected from discriminatory exclusion by its J.E.B.
ruling.
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challenge despite the constitutional limitations placed upon it.244 These
lawyers do not believe that Batson or Wheeler hearings (the mechanisms
for enforcing those constitutional limitations) occur too frequently or
take up too much court time.245 Considering that Motton has prohibit-
ed peremptory challenges based on intersectionality since 1985 and that
most of the surveyed attorneys are California state court practitioners
subject to Motton's dictates, their assessments of the peremptory chal-
lenge's value and Batson's burden deserve some deference.2 6 Their
assessments indicate that extending Batson to intersectional dis-
crimination is more than viable.
247
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the recurring
problem of peremptory challenges based on intersectional status. This
sort of discrimination occurs when a litigant's peremptory challenges
target a particular combination of race and gender, such as African
American women, as opposed to targeting race (African Americans),
gender (women), or race and gender (African Americans and women).
This Article has demonstrated that the peremptory challenge can more
244. See supra notes 97-100, 105 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
246. See Underwood, supra note 12, at 769 (noting that more than a decade of experi-
ence with Batson and related state rules suggests that administering the rule is not
cost prohibitive).
247. We can also anticipate "the triple play": a peremptory challenge directed at a jury
panelist who falls into three (or more) protected categories. For instance, assume a
domestic violence case with a black male defendant and a black female complainant.
Assume further that Batson has been extended to prohibit religion-based peremptory
challenges. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. The prosecutor might chal-
lenge a black Muslim woman while accepting other black women panelists on the
assumption that the black Muslim woman is more likely to support patriarchal
notions of family than other black women and women generally.
For practical reasons, Shoben would not permit the consideration of more than
two categories in a Tide VII disparate impact case. Shoben, supra note 195, at 807,
821. However, a Batson motion requires a showing of purposeful discrimination;
disproportionate impact will not suffice. See supra note 53. Because of the more
difficult proof requirement in Batson hearings, the practical concerns in the Batson
context are not as great as those in the Tide VII disparate impact context, and
setting limits on the number of protected categories that may be considered is
therefore less compelling. Even Shoben distinguishes the Tide VII disparate treat-
ment cases and would not restrict the number of protected categories that are
considered in that context. Shoben, supra note 195, at 821, 835.
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than withstand the extension of Batson to intersectional discrimination
in jury selection. The Article has further shown that Batson and norma-
tive considerations require that extension. In the event that courts refuse
to recognize peremptory challenges based on intersectional status as a
distinct category of impermissible challenges, this sort of discrimination
in jury selection remains both race and gender discrimination and
should be impermissible on both counts. t
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APPENDIX A
SURVEY
1. Given the judicial limits on the exercise of peremptory challenges, are
peremptory challenges of any value to the litigants?*
Peremptory challenges are of great value / some value / no value.
(Please circle one.)
2. Why?
3. Were peremptory challenges of any more value pre-Batson (or pre-
Wheeler for attorneys practicing in the state courts)?
Peremptory challenges were of significantly greater value / slightly more
value / the same value L less value. (Please circle one.)
4. Why?
*Although I circulated a draft survey for comments with no negative feed-
back, this question turned out to be imprecisely worded. It should have read,
"Given the constitutional limits. . ." Some attorneys indicated that they thought
the question was vague. Some noted that any limits were statutory and not judi-
cial. In any event, I believe that the answers regarding the value of peremptory
challenges remain well taken.
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5. How often has a Batson or Wheeler motion been made by you, your co-
counsel, or the opposition attorney in cases which you have personally tried?
Such motions were made in all cases / most cases / some cases / no cases,
(Please circle one.)
6. Do Batson/Wheeler motions take up too much court time?**
Batson/Wheeler motions do / do not take up too much court time. (Please
circle one.)
16. How would you describe yourself?
I am a prosecutor / defense attorney. (Please circle one.)
I have practiced as a trial attorney only in federal court / only in state
court / in both federal and state courts. (Please circle one.)
FOR ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE PRACTICED
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS:
I was / was not practicing pre-Batson. (Please circle one.)
FOR ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE PRACTICED
IN THE STATE COURTS:
I was/was not practicing pre-Wheeler. (Please circle one.)
I have personally tried approximately - jury trials. (Please
indicate number.)
**The question calls upon the responding trial lawyer to evaluate the amount
of time spent on Batson/Wheeler motions given the lawyer's professional apprecia-
tion of the purpose of these motions and how these motions fit into the larger
picture of jury selection and the complete trial.
[Vol. 3:369




A profile of the attorneys:
Prosecutors 98
Defense Attorneys 96
Federal Practice Only 9
State Practice Only 150





Over 100 trials 29
Pre-Batson Federal Practice 23
Pre-Whee/er State Practice 73
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TABLE 4
THE FREQUENCY OF BATSON/WHEELER MOTIONS
[Vol. 3:369
SuhmtosEntire Prosecutors J Defense
were made in... [ Po tony
I I I
I I I
I I Iailcases 2 1.03% 1 I 1.04% 1 I 1.04%
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